Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?

36 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2006

See all articles by Eitan Goldman

Eitan Goldman

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jongil So

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jörg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2006

Abstract

In countries with a weak legal system and a high level of corruption it has been shown that political connections are valuable to a corporation. This paper explores whether political connections are also important in the U.S., which has well-developed financial markets as well as a strong legal system. The paper uses an original hand-collected data set on the political connections of board members of S&P 500 companies to sort companies into those connected to the Republican Party and those connected to the Democratic Party. An analysis of the stock price response to the announcement of the board nomination of a politically connected director shows a positive abnormal stock return. The paper also analyses the stock price response to the Republican win in the 2000 Presidential Election and finds that companies connected to the Republican Party increase in value while companies connected to the Democratic Party decrease in value. The results further suggest that these effects are more pronounced for larger corporations. Finally, the paper controls for political donations by corporations prior to the 2000 election and finds that, unlike board connections, donations do not predict industry-adjusted abnormal post-election returns.

Keywords: Politics, Boards, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G14, G18, G30, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Goldman, Eitan and So, Jongil and Rocholl, Joerg, Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? (August 1, 2006). AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=891426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.891426

Eitan Goldman (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )

1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-856-0749 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
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Belgium

Jongil So

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Joerg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/en/159244

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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