Long Persuasion Games

51 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2006

See all articles by Frédéric Koessler

Frédéric Koessler

University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA

Francoise Forges

Université Paris Dauphine - CEREMADE; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 2006


This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.

Keywords: cheap talk, communication, diconvexification, dimartingale, disclosure of certifiable information, jointly controlled lotteries, long conversation, persuasion, verifiable types

JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Koessler, Frédéric and Forges, Francoise, Long Persuasion Games (February 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=892729 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.892729

Frédéric Koessler

University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA ( email )

33 boulevard du port
F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, 95011

Francoise Forges (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine - CEREMADE ( email )

Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris Cedex 16, 75775

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679

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