Long Persuasion Games
51 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2006
Date Written: February 2006
Abstract
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.
Keywords: cheap talk, communication, diconvexification, dimartingale, disclosure of certifiable information, jointly controlled lotteries, long conversation, persuasion, verifiable types
JEL Classification: C72, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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