A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms

38 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2006

See all articles by Assar Lindbeck

Assar Lindbeck

; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Mats Persson

Stockholm University; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 2006

Abstract

A large literature on ex ante moral hazard in income insurance emphasizes that the individual can affect the probability of an income loss by choice of lifestyle and hence, the degree of risk-taking. The much smaller literature on moral hazard ex post mainly analyzes how a "moral hazard constraint" can make the individual abstain from fraud ("mimicking"). The present paper instead presents a model of moral hazard ex post without a moral hazard constraint; the individual's ability and willingness to work is represented by a continuous stochastic variable in the utility function, and the extent of moral hazard depends on the generosity of the insurance system. Our model is also well suited for analyzing social norms concerning work and benefit dependency.

Keywords: moral hazard, sick pay insurance, labor supply, asymmetric information

JEL Classification: G22, H53, I38, J21

Suggested Citation

Lindbeck, Assar and Persson, Mats, A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms (February 2006). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1675. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=892735

Assar Lindbeck (Contact Author)

( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden
+46 8 163 078 (Phone)
+46 8 162 946 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.ifn.se/assarl

Mats Persson

Stockholm University ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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