Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Systems

Posted: 29 Mar 2006  

Koji Takamiya

Osaka University

Akira Tanaka

Hokkaido University

Date Written: March 2, 2006

Abstract

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting systems, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We point out that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.

Keywords: computational complexity, NP-completeness, simple game, core, stability, Nakamura number

JEL Classification: C71, D71

Suggested Citation

Takamiya, Koji and Tanaka, Akira, Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Systems (March 2, 2006). Osaka University Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 653. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=893667

Koji Takamiya (Contact Author)

Osaka University ( email )

1-1 Yamadaoka
Suita
Osaka, 565-0871
Japan

Akira Tanaka

Hokkaido University ( email )

5 Kita 8 Jonishi, Kita Ward
Hokkaido Prefecture
Sapporo, 060-0808
Japan

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