How Disaggregation Enhances the Credibility of Management Earnings Forecasts

48 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2006 Last revised: 25 Oct 2015

See all articles by D. Eric Hirst

D. Eric Hirst

University of Texas at Austin

Lisa Koonce

University of Texas

Shankar Venkataraman

Bentley University - McCallum Graduate School of Business

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Abstract

An important problem facing firm managers is how to enhance the credibility, or believability, of their earnings forecasts. In this paper, we experimentally test whether a characteristic of an earnings forecast from managementýnamely, whether it is disaggregatedýcan affect its credibility. We also test whether disaggregation moderates the relation between managerial incentives and forecast credibility. Disaggregated forecasts include an earnings forecast as well as forecasts of other key line items comprising that earnings forecast. Our results indicate that disaggregated forecasts are judged to be more credible than aggregated ones and that disaggregation works to counteract the effect of high incentives. We also develop and test an original model that explains how disaggregation positively impacts three factors that, in turn, influence forecast credibility: perceived precision of management's beliefs, perceived clarity of the forecast, and perceived financial reporting quality. We show that forecast disaggregation works to remedy incentive problems only via its effect on perceived financial reporting quality. Overall, our study adds to our understanding of how firm managers can credibly communicate their expectations about the future to market participants.

Keywords: Disaggregation, Credibility, Management Earnings Forecasts

JEL Classification: M41, M45, D82, C91

Suggested Citation

Hirst, D. Eric and Koonce, Lisa L. and Venkataraman, Shankar, How Disaggregation Enhances the Credibility of Management Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, September 2007, McCombs Research Paper Series No. ACC-05-06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=893840

D. Eric Hirst (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

CBA 4M.202 McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5565 (Phone)
512-471-3904 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/Eric.hirst/

Lisa L. Koonce

University of Texas ( email )

Dept. of Accounting
McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5576 (Phone)
512-471-3904 (Fax)

Shankar Venkataraman

Bentley University - McCallum Graduate School of Business ( email )

Waltham, MA 02452-4705
United States

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