A Market-Clearing Role for Inefficiency on a Limit Order Book

34 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2006

See all articles by Jeremy H. Large

Jeremy H. Large

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 16, 2007


Using a stochastic sequential game, this paper models limit order book trading dynamics. It deduces ex ante surplus and some agents' strategies by using an intuitive stationarity property of equilibrium. This largely bypasses any need for direct analysis of agents' (traders') intricate forecasting problems. Surplus per agent, while decreasing in the bid-ask spread, is invariant to some interesting dynamic features of the model. One interpretation of this is that market inefficiency is fixed by the spread at a 'liquidity market-clearing' level. The model best describes cases where price-discreteness leads to a mainly-constant spread. Here, a smaller price tick size raises surplus, and is to be encouraged.

Keywords: stochastic sequential game, ergodic equilibrium, market microstructure, limit order book, market depths, bid-ask spread

JEL Classification: C73, G14, G24

Suggested Citation

Large, Jeremy H., A Market-Clearing Role for Inefficiency on a Limit Order Book (January 16, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894121 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.894121

Jeremy H. Large (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

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