A Theory of Consumer Boycotts Under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition

27 Pages Posted: 8 May 2006

See all articles by Robert Innes

Robert Innes

University of Arizona - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract

This article models strategic interactions between non-identical duopolistic firms and a public interest/environmental organisation (EO) that promotes 'green' production practices by threatening consumer boycotts against 'brown' producers. The article describes when boycotts are deterred by prior firm commitments to be 'green' and, also when a boycott arises in equilibrium, despite symmetric information. When a boycott arises, it is either a small persistent boycott against the 'small firm' in the industry, or a large transitory boycott against the 'large firm' in the industry that prompts the target firm to accede to the boycott demands quickly.

Suggested Citation

Innes, Robert D., A Theory of Consumer Boycotts Under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition. Economic Journal, Vol. 116, No. 511, pp. 355-381, April 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894509 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01084.x

Robert D. Innes (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

1110 E. North Campus Drive
Tucson, AZ 85721-0023
United States
520-621-9741 (Phone)
520-621-6250 (Fax)

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