Interbank Contagion at Work: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

47 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2006 Last revised: 9 Nov 2009

See all articles by Rajkamal Iyer

Rajkamal Iyer

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

José-Luis Peydró

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification we exploit an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals. Second, the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals. Third, interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock. Finally, we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects. These results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications.

Keywords: Contagion, banking crisis, interbank market, runs

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G14, E58

Suggested Citation

Iyer, Rajkamal and Peydro, Jose-Luis, Interbank Contagion at Work: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (June 1, 2009). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=895061

Rajkamal Iyer

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Jose-Luis Peydro (Contact Author)

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 1756 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joseluispeydroswebpage/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
693
Abstract Views
3,938
Rank
58,898
PlumX Metrics