A Computational Electoral Competition Model with Social Clustering and Endogenous Interest Groups as Information Brokers

25 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2006

See all articles by Vjollca Sadiraj

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University - Department of Economics

Jan Tuinstra

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE); Tinbergen Institute

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election and the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences to the political parties, and they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find that the introduction of social dynamics and interest groups increases the separation between parties platforms, prohibits convergence to the center of the distribution of voter preferences, and increases the size of the winning set.

Keywords: Computational political economy, social dynamics, interest groups, spatial competition, polling, campaign contributions

JEL Classification: D72, D83

Suggested Citation

Sadiraj, Vjollca and Tuinstra, Jan and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., A Computational Electoral Competition Model with Social Clustering and Endogenous Interest Groups as Information Brokers (July 2004). Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 06-29, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=895171 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.895171

Vjollca Sadiraj (Contact Author)

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States

Jan Tuinstra

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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