Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of Vote Rotation in Committees

Bosman, Ronald; Maier, Philipp; Sadiraj, Vjollca; Van Winden, F. A. A. M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.895175

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Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of Vote Rotation in Committees

Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper No. 06-30

29 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2006

See all articles by Ronald Bosman

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University - Department of Economics

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: December 2005

Abstract

We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committee's efficiency, and (ii) the extent to which rotation critically influences collective and individual welfare. The experiment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off individual versus common interests. Our findings indicate that the choice of a rotation scheme has important consequences: it 'pays' to be allowed to vote, as voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting members. Hence, rotation is not neutral. We also find that smaller committees decide faster and block fewer decisions. This reduces frustration among committee members.

Keywords: Decision-making, committee, experiment, voting, rotation

JEL Classification: D70, D78, E58

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Bosman, Ronald and Maier, Philipp and Sadiraj, Vjollca and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of Vote Rotation in Committees (December 2005). Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper No. 06-30, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=895175 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.895175