Conditions for Judicial Independence

26 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2006 Last revised: 21 Feb 2017

McNollgast

Duke University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Economics

Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Date Written: May 17, 2009

Abstract

Judicial dependence is much discussed in political science and law, but the definitions are often contradictory or inconsistent. Instead of defining judicial independence as a permanent feature of the institutional environment, we develop a model in which judicial independence is an equilibrium outcome of a game between the judiciary, legislature and executive. Accordingly, the independence of the judiciary varies with changes in the composition of the branches of government. This approach to judicial independence helps to explain some of the major confrontations between the judiciary and other branches of government in both the United States and other countries.

Keywords: judicial independence, congressional oversight, federal courts

JEL Classification: K00, K41

Suggested Citation

McNollgast and Noll, Roger G. and Weingast, Barry R., Conditions for Judicial Independence (May 17, 2009). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-43. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=895723

McNollgast

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States

Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-2297 (Phone)
650-725-5702 (Fax)

Barry R. Weingast (Contact Author)

Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

Paper statistics

Downloads
502
Rank
43,998
Abstract Views
1,832