Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=895723
 
 

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Conditions for Judicial Independence


McNollgast


Duke University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Economics

Roger G. Noll


Stanford University - Department of Economics

Barry R. Weingast


Stanford University, Department of Political Science

May 17, 2009

Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-43

Abstract:     
Judicial dependence is much discussed in political science and law, but the definitions are often contradictory or inconsistent. Instead of defining judicial independence as a permanent feature of the institutional environment, we develop a model in which judicial independence is an equilibrium outcome of a game between the judiciary, legislature and executive. Accordingly, the independence of the judiciary varies with changes in the composition of the branches of government. This approach to judicial independence helps to explain some of the major confrontations between the judiciary and other branches of government in both the United States and other countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: judicial independence, congressional oversight, federal courts

JEL Classification: K00, K41


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Date posted: April 8, 2006 ; Last revised: February 21, 2017

Suggested Citation

McNollgast and Noll, Roger G. and Weingast, Barry R., Conditions for Judicial Independence (May 17, 2009). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-43. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=895723

Contact Information

McNollgast
Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )
140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
Roger G. Noll
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-2297 (Phone)
650-725-5702 (Fax)
Barry R. Weingast (Contact Author)
Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/
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