Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan

72 Pages Posted: 16 May 2006 Last revised: 24 Aug 2022

See all articles by Ricardo J. Caballero

Ricardo J. Caballero

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Takeo Hoshi

University of California at San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Anil K. Kashyap

University of Chicago, Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2006

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a bank-based explanation for the decade-long Japanese slowdown following the asset price collapse in the early 1990s. We start with the well-known observation that most large Japanese banks were only able to comply with capital standards because regulators were lax in their inspections. To facilitate this forbearance the banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (that we call zombies). Thus, the normal competitive outcome whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose market share was thwarted. Our model highlights the restructuring implications of the zombie problem. The counterpart of the congestion created by the zombies is a reduction of the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their entry and investment. In this context, even solvent banks do not find good lending opportunities. We confirm our story's key predictions that zombie-dominated industries exhibit more depressed job creation and destruction, and lower productivity. We present firm-level regressions showing that the increase in zombies depressed the investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the productivity gap between zombies and non-zombies.

Suggested Citation

Caballero, Ricardo J. and Hoshi, Takeo and Kashyap, Anil K., Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan (April 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12129, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=896203

Ricardo J. Caballero (Contact Author)

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