Leniency and Cartel Size: A Note on How Self-Reporting Nurtures Collusion in Concentrated Markets

9 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2006

Date Written: April 2006

Abstract

Leniency programs lower the expected cost of anticompetitive behavior to the extent that they allow colluding firms to pay reduced fines. This paper connects this potential adverse effect to the number of firms involved in the cartel agreement. It is shown that leniency programs may provide firms with an incentive to form cartels of limited size in concentrated markets.

Keywords: Leniency programs, Cartels, Self-reporting, Collusion

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L41, L44

Suggested Citation

Bos, Iwan, Leniency and Cartel Size: A Note on How Self-Reporting Nurtures Collusion in Concentrated Markets (April 2006). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2006-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=896670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.896670

Iwan Bos (Contact Author)

Maastricht University ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200MD
Netherlands

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