Gatekeepers Failures (and Non-Independence) on Parmalat

Banca Impresa Societa No. 2005/2

28 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2006

See all articles by Simone di Castri

Simone di Castri

Independent

Francesco Benedetto

University of Bologna - Faculty of Law

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

This article edited in Italian focuses on the weaknesses of the regulatory framework exposed by directors' and gatekeepers' behaviour and their contribution to Parmalat's fraud. It will also address how these regulatory gaps might be filled, and while propose some solutions. First, we offer a brief description of the industrial, economic and financial structures of Parmalat's group and of the events which forced the company to reveal its financial status. This will help to highlight a number of violations carried out by the directors and those who had the duty of controlling and watching over Parmalat, including the independent directors and the auditors. The atmosphere of laxity amongst the financial analysts, the rating agencies and the banks (as creditors, brokers, dealers, etc.), allowed Callisto Tanzi, the founder and the chairman of the group, and the other managers to perpetrate the fraud whose scope is now well known. Directors and auditing regulation will be analyzed particularly.

Note: Downloadable document is in Italian.

Keywords: Parmalat, Enron, financial frauds, financial scandals, directors, amministratori, collegio sindacale, auditing, auditors, revisione contabile, gatekeepers, market abuse

Suggested Citation

di Castri, Simone and Benedetto, Francesco, Gatekeepers Failures (and Non-Independence) on Parmalat (August 2005). Banca Impresa Societa No. 2005/2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=897042 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.897042

Francesco Benedetto

University of Bologna - Faculty of Law ( email )

Via Zamboni, 22
Bologna, 40126
Italy

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