Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=898859
 
 

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How to Separate the Roles of Chairman and CEO


Simon C. Y. Wong


Northwestern University School of Law; London School of Economics; McKinsey & Co. Inc.

Robert F. Felton


affiliation not provided to SSRN


The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 4, 2004

Abstract:     
Under pressure from shareholders and regulators to improve corporate governance, companies in the United States are increasingly splitting the roles of chairman and CEO. Experience from the United Kingdom, where the same shift began a decade ago, shows that what may seem like a straightforward change of responsibilities is actually a complicated process influenced by unpredictable variables, such as the personal psychology of the two people chosen for the posts. Many companies thought they were splitting the roles well, only to stumble along the way.

Company directors, who bear ultimate responsibility for making the split succeed, can take practical steps to smooth the process, from choosing the best moment for implementing the change to ensuring that the executives chosen to hold these two positions have complementary characters and ambitions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: corporate governance, separation of chairman and CEO roles

JEL Classification: G34


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Date posted: April 30, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Wong, Simon C. Y. and Felton, Robert F., How to Separate the Roles of Chairman and CEO. The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 4, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=898859

Contact Information

Simon C. Y. Wong (Contact Author)
Northwestern University School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/simon-wong.htm

McKinsey & Co. Inc. ( email )
1 Jermyn Street
London, England SW1Y 4UH
United Kingdom
Robert F. Felton
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN


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