American Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, pp. 645-668, 2009
43 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2006 Last revised: 17 Sep 2014
Date Written: March 20, 2009
Every dictator dislikes free media. Yet, many non-democratic countries have partially free or almost free media. In this paper, we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory. In our model, free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government. The importance of this benefit varies with the natural-resource endowment. In resource-rich countries, bureaucratic incentives are less important for the dictator; hence, media freedom is less likely to emerge. Using panel data, we show that controlling for country fixed effects, media are less free in oil-rich economies, with the effect especially pronounced in non-democratic regimes. These results are robust to model specification and the inclusion of various controls, including economic development, democracy, country size, size of government, and others.
Keywords: media freedom, non-democratic politics, bureaucracy, resource curse
JEL Classification: P16, D72, D80, Q4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Egorov, Georgy and Guriev, Sergei M. and Sonin, Konstantin, Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (March 20, 2009). American Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, pp. 645-668, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=898888