Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from Ebay

17 Pages Posted: 8 May 2006

See all articles by Daniel Houser

Daniel Houser

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

John Wooders

New York University Abu Dhabi; University Technology Sydney

Abstract

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

Suggested Citation

Houser, Daniel and Wooders, John C., Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from Ebay. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 15, pp. 353-369, Summer 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=899187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x

Daniel Houser (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science ( email )

5th Floor, Vernon Smith Hall
George Mason University
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
7039934856 (Phone)

John C. Wooders

New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
+971 126285802 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://johnwooders.com

University Technology Sydney ( email )

15 Broadway, Ultimo
PO Box 123
Sydney, NSW 2007
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://johnwooders.com/

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