Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance? An Empirical Analysis of EU Directives 1978-1999

European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 180-206, 2007

44 Pages Posted: 3 May 2006 Last revised: 16 Jun 2010

See all articles by Richard Perkins

Richard Perkins

London School of Economics - Department of Geography and Environment

Eric Neumayer

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: July 1, 2006

Abstract

Underlying several theories of European integration is the idea that countries' willingness to sign-up to supranational rules is dependent on the expectation and/or realisation of various benefits. In this paper, we explore whether such benefits also affect member states' implementation of these rules. Using econometric techniques, we estimate the influence of several measures of membership benefits on the annual number of legal infringements received by 15 member states over the period 1978-1999. Our results provide qualified support for the idea that benefits positively influence compliance. We find that greater intra-EU trade dependence and voting power in European institutions relative to population size are negatively associated with legal infringements. Yet, contrary to a priori expectations, net fiscal transfers are positively correlated with infringements.

Keywords: Benefits, Compliance, European integration, Implementation, Rational choice

Suggested Citation

Perkins, Richard and Neumayer, Eric, Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance? An Empirical Analysis of EU Directives 1978-1999 (July 1, 2006). European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 180-206, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=899282

Richard Perkins (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Department of Geography and Environment ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Eric Neumayer

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 207 955 7598 (Phone)
+44 207 955 7412 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/neumayer

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
93
Abstract Views
858
rank
284,573
PlumX Metrics