Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule

12 Pages Posted: 7 May 2006

See all articles by Shigehiro Serizawa

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: March 3, 2006

Abstract

We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.

Keywords: strategy-proofness, anonymity, indivisible good, Vickrey allocation rule

JEL Classification: D44, C78, D71, D61, D82

Suggested Citation

Serizawa, Shigehiro, Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule (March 3, 2006). Institute of Social and Economic Research at Osaka University Discussion Paper No. 648, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=899458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.899458

Shigehiro Serizawa (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

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