Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation

53 Pages Posted: 3 May 2006 Last revised: 4 Mar 2018

See all articles by Claudia M. Landeo

Claudia M. Landeo

University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Maxim Nikitin

Higher School of Economics

Linda Babcock

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

This paper studies experimentally the impact of the split-award statute, where the state takes a share of the plaintiff's punitive damage award, on litigation outcomes. Our findings indicate that dispute rates are significantly lower when bargaining is performed under the split-award institution. Defendants' litigation losses and plaintiffs' net compensation are significantly reduced by the split-award statute.

Keywords: Settlement; Bargaining, Litigation, Asymmetric Information, Experiments

JEL Classification: K41, C70, D82, C90

Suggested Citation

Landeo, Claudia M. and Nikitin, Maxim and Babcock, Linda C., Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation (2016). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=899700

Claudia M. Landeo (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Economics ( email )

Henry Marshall Tory Building 7-25
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/ualberta.ca/claudia-m-landeo-s-home-page/home

Maxim Nikitin

Higher School of Economics ( email )

ICEF
Pokrovskiy bulvar 11
Moscow, 109028
Russia

Linda C. Babcock

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-8789 (Phone)
412-268-7036 (Fax)

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