Two Classes of Cooperative Games Related to One-Object Auction Situations

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2006-25

10 Pages Posted: 9 May 2006

See all articles by Rodica Branzei

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Vito Fragnelli

University of Piemonte Orientale - Dip. di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate

Ana Meca

Miguel Hernandez University

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers is known by all of them. Then two cooperative games, which we call the auction game and the ring game, corresponding to such a market situation are considered. Auction games are related to special total big boss games, while ring games are related to special convex games, the peer group games. It turns out that there exists a duality relation between the auction game and the ring game arising from the same two-corner market situation. For both classes of games relevant solution concepts are studied.

Keywords: market games, ring games, one-object auction situations, big boss games, peer group games

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Branzei, Rodica and Fragnelli, Vito and Meca, Ana and Tijs, Stef H., Two Classes of Cooperative Games Related to One-Object Auction Situations (March 2006). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2006-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900107 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.900107

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Iasi
Romania

Vito Fragnelli (Contact Author)

University of Piemonte Orientale - Dip. di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate ( email )

Via V. Bellini, 25/G
15100 Alessandria
Italy
+39+010+3536838 (Phone)
+39+010+3536752 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mfn.unipmn.it/~fragnell/

Ana Meca

Miguel Hernandez University ( email )

Elche Campus, La Galia Building
Avda. del Ferrocarril, s/n
Elche, 03202
Spain

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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