University of Crete Economics Working Paper No. 06-9
17 Pages Posted: 9 May 2006
Date Written: May 2, 2006
We study firms' incentives to transfer knowledge about production technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. In a setting where two technologies are available, a technology is characterized by its associated cost function and no single technology is strictly superior to the other. A firm has superior information if it knows both techniques and the other only one. Cost efficiency may be reversed after the voluntary disclosure, so that the rival's costs are improved at the equilibrium level of output. Adding R&D investments to the picture, we find that a firm can decide to invest just for the purpose of acquiring knowledge that will be transferred and not used. Furthermore, for the same point in the parameters space, the acquisiton of full knowledge may occur or not as a function of the initial distribution of information.
Keywords: Oligopoly, Information disclosure, R&D Joint Ventures, R&D Consortia, Returns To Scale
JEL Classification: L13, O30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bacchiega, Emanuele and Garella, Paolo G., Disclosing vs. Withholding Technology Knowledge in a Duopoly (May 2, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.900118