When Does Strategic Debt Service Matter?

Posted: 9 May 2006

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Jing-Zhi Huang

Pennsylvania State University - University Park - Department of Finance

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Rangarajan K. Sundaram

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 5 versions of this paper

Abstract

Recent work in corporate finance has suggested that strategic debt-service by equityholders works to lower debt values and raise yield spreads substantially. We show that this is not quite correct. With optimal cash management, defaults occasioned by deliberate underperformance (strategic defaults) and those forced by inadequate cash (liquidity defaults) work as substitutes: allowing for strategic debt-service leads to a decline in the equilibrium likelihood of liquidity defaults. In some cases, this decline is sufficiently sharp that equilibrium debt values actually increase and yield spreads decline. We provide an intuitive explanation for these results in terms of an interaction of optionalities.

Keywords: Strategic debt-service, optimal cash management, liquidity defaults, strategic defaults, yield spreads

JEL Classification: G13, G33, G35

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Huang, Jing-Zhi Jay and Subrahmanyam, Marti G. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K., When Does Strategic Debt Service Matter?. Economic Theory, pp. 1-16, April 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900163

Viral V. Acharya (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/~vacharya.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

Jing-Zhi Jay Huang

Pennsylvania State University - University Park - Department of Finance ( email )

University Park, PA 16802
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.personal.psu.edu/jxh56

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business,
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-68
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0348 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)

Rangarajan K. Sundaram

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0308 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)

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