Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

34 Pages Posted: 11 May 2006

See all articles by Stefan Voigt

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Michael Wilhelm Ebeling

University of Kassel - Department of Economics

Lorenz Blume

Phillips University Marburg

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Abstract

It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as their final court of appeals even after independence. This court is thus taken as a natural experiment to test our hypothesis. It turns out that retaining the jurisdiction is indeed significant for explaining economic growth.

Keywords: Credibility, Delegation of Competence, Judicial Independence, Economic History, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

JEL Classification: H11, K11, K41, N40, O57, P51

Suggested Citation

Voigt, Stefan and Ebeling, Michael Wilhelm and Blume, Lorenz, Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Journal of Development Economics, Forthcoming, 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900340

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Michael Wilhelm Ebeling

University of Kassel - Department of Economics ( email )

Nora-Platiel Str. 4
34109 Kassel
Germany

Lorenz Blume

Phillips University Marburg ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany

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