Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale
27 Pages Posted: 11 May 2006
Date Written: April 2006
The traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to be particularly successful in explaining the extent of tax compliance. We argue instead that a psychological tax contract which establishes a fiscal exchange between the state and the citizens shapes tax compliance to a large extent. In that respect, a case study of Switzerland is useful because the small size of the cantons and their direct democratic political systems procedurally establish a close exchange relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities. In this paper, evidence is discussed on how tax evasion and tax morale in Switzerland evolved over time. In addition, the impact of economic, legal, socio-demographic, psychological and institutional factors on Swiss tax evasion is discussed.
Keywords: Tax Evasion, Tax Morale, Deterrence, Responsive Regulation
JEL Classification: H26, H73, D73, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation