Five-Equation Macroeconomics: A Simple View of the Interactions between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy

48 Pages Posted: 3 May 2006

See all articles by David Vines

David Vines

University of Oxford - Balliol College - Department of Economics; Australian National University (ANU); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Tatiana Kirsanova

University of Glasgow - Adam Smith Business School

Sven Jari Stehn

Brasenose College

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

This paper studies the interactions of fiscal and monetary policy when they stabilise a single economy against shocks in a dynamic setting. We assume that fiscal and monetary policies both stabilise the economy only by causing changes to aggregate demand. Our findings are as follows. If the both policymakers are benevolent, then the best outcome is achieved when the fiscal authority allows monetary policy to perform nearly all of the burden of stabilising the economy. If the monetary authorities are benevolent, but the fiscal authorities have distorted objectives, then a Nash equilibrium will result in large welfare losses: unilateral efforts by each authority to stabilise the economy will result in a rapid accumulation of public debt. However, if the monetary authorities are benevolent and the fiscal authorities have distorted objectives, but there is a regime of fiscal leadership, then the outcome will be very nearly as good as it is in the regime in which both policymakers are benevolent.

Keywords: Monetary policy, macroeconomic stabilisation, fiscal policy

JEL Classification: E52, E61, E63

Suggested Citation

Vines, David and Kirsanova, Tatiana and Stehn, Sven Jari, Five-Equation Macroeconomics: A Simple View of the Interactions between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy (January 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5464, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900369

David Vines (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Balliol College - Department of Economics ( email )

Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ, Oxfordshire OX13UQ
United Kingdom
+44 1865 271 067 (Phone)
+44 1865 271 094 (Fax)

Australian National University (ANU)

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory
Australia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Tatiana Kirsanova

University of Glasgow - Adam Smith Business School ( email )

Glasgow, Scotland
United Kingdom

Sven Jari Stehn

Brasenose College ( email )

Oxford OX1 4AJ
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
41
Abstract Views
1,497
PlumX Metrics