Overcoming Participation Constraints

52 Pages Posted: 3 May 2006

See all articles by Hanming Fang

Hanming Fang

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Peter Norman

University of British Columbia - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, and satisfies interim participation, incentive and resource constraints.

Note: A previous version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=713023

Keywords: Linking, Participation Constraints, Groves Mechanisms, Veto Power

JEL Classification: D61, D82, H41

Suggested Citation

Fang, Hanming and Norman, Peter, Overcoming Participation Constraints (April 2005). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1511R, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900425

Hanming Fang (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Peter Norman

University of British Columbia - Department of Economics ( email )

2329 West Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia BC V6T 1Z2
Canada
(604) 822-2839 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/pnorman/

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