Download This PaperOvercoming Participation Constraints
52 Pages Posted: 3 May 2006
There are 2 versions of this paper
Overcoming Participation Constraints
Overcoming Participation Constraints
Date Written: April 2005
Abstract
This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, and satisfies interim participation, incentive and resource constraints.
Note: A previous version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=713023
Keywords: Linking, Participation Constraints, Groves Mechanisms, Veto Power
JEL Classification: D61, D82, H41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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