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Delegation, Risk Diversification, and the Properly Political Project of Administrative Law

32 Pages Posted: 4 May 2006  

Abstract

This essay replies to a recent article by Professor Matthew Stephenson, "Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice between Agencies and Courts," 119 Harvard Law Review 1035 (2006). In his article, Professor Stephenson develops a model to explain why and in what circumstances Congress delegates regulatory power to agencies rather than courts. This reply essentially picks up where Stephenson leaves off, considering more fully the relationship between Congressional instrument choice and the (oft neglected) political project of administrative law.

Keywords: administrative law, law and politics

JEL Classification: K1

Suggested Citation

Rodriguez, Daniel B., Delegation, Risk Diversification, and the Properly Political Project of Administrative Law. Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 116, 2006; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-48. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900430

Daniel B. Rodriguez (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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