Opposites Attract: The Effect of the Federal Income Tax Code on Community Composition

University of Colorado Working Paper 95-10

Posted: 5 Jul 1998

See all articles by Charles De Bartolome

Charles De Bartolome

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics

Stuart S. Rosenthal

Syracuse University - Department of Economics; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Date Written: October 1995

Abstract

The federal income tax code provides an incentive for developers to organize homes for different types of families as a single heterogeneous community. The property tax deduction and a progressive rate structure cause the property tax to be subsidized at a rate which increases with family income. Since owners of high-income homes pay more property tax in a heterogeneous community than in a homogeneous community, ceteris paribus the establishment of a mixed-income community shifts the property tax towards families that are subsidized at a higher rate. This raises the overall federal subsidy of the property tax causing aggregate property values to increase. Similarly, restrictions on saving in tax-deferring assets imply that young and elderly families are likely to use different interest rates to capitalize future property taxes. In this case, the capitalized value of the property tax stream is lower in a mixed-age community which also causes aggregate property values to increase. In both cases, heterogeneous communities are established provided different family types desire similar levels of public service.

JEL Classification: D7, H1, H2, H7, R1, R5

Suggested Citation

De Bartolome, Charles A. M. and Rosenthal, Stuart S., Opposites Attract: The Effect of the Federal Income Tax Code on Community Composition (October 1995). University of Colorado Working Paper 95-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=9008

Charles A. M. De Bartolome (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309-0256
United States
303-492-4464 (Phone)
303-492-8960 (Fax)

Stuart S. Rosenthal

Syracuse University - Department of Economics ( email )

426 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244-1020
United States
315-443-3809 (Phone)

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

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