Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - a Selective Survey

40 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006 Last revised: 5 Jun 2010

See all articles by Pablo T. Spiller

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Sanny Liao

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

The participation of interest groups in public policy making is unavoidable. Its unavoidable nature is only matched by the universal suspicion with which it has been seen by both policy makers and the public. Recently, however, there has been a growing literature that examines the participation of interest groups in public policy making from a New Institutional Economics perspective. The distinguishing feature of the New Institutional Economics Approach is its emphasis in opening up the black box of decision-making, whether in understanding the rules of the game, or the play of the game. In this paper we do not attempt to fairly describe the vast literature on interest group's behavior. Instead, the purpose of this essay for the New Institutional Economics Guide Book is to review recent papers that follow the NIE mantra. That is, they attempt to explicate the micro-analytic features of the way interest groups actually interact with policy-makers, rather than providing an abstract high-level representation. We emphasize the role of the institutional environment in understanding interest groups' strategies.

Suggested Citation

Spiller, Pablo T. and Liao, Sanny, Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - a Selective Survey (May 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12209. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900994

Pablo T. Spiller (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )

545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)

Sanny Liao

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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