18 Pages Posted: 10 May 2006 Last revised: 1 Oct 2012
Date Written: December 1, 2006
We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of industry concentration in common value auctions. Greater concentration of information among fewer bidders reduces competition but increases the precision of private estimates. We demonstrate that this generally leads to more aggressive bidding. However, the reduction in competition dominates the informational effects, resulting in lower prices. We examine these hypothesized effects experimentally by conducting a series of auctions with constant informational content but distributed among a varying number of bidders. The experimental results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.
Keywords: common value auctions, information, joint bidding, industry concentration
JEL Classification: D44, L41, C92
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Mares, Vlad and Shor, Mikhael, Industry Concentration in Common Value Auctions: Theory and Evidence (December 1, 2006). Economic Theory, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2008, pp. 37-56. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=901067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.901067