Public Enforcement of Law

Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven

doi:10.2139/ssrn.901512

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Public Enforcement of Law

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 322

31 Pages Posted: 16 May 2006

See all articles by A. Mitchell Polinsky

A. Mitchell Polinsky

Stanford Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Steven Shavell

Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

This entry for the forthcoming The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Second Edition) surveys the economic analysis of public enforcement of law - the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first discuss the basic elements of the theory: the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions (fines, imprisonment), and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions, including the costs of imposing fines, mistake, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenses, and incapacitation.

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, Public Enforcement of Law (May 2006). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 322, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=901512 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.901512