CEO Compensation and Board Structure

Chhaochharia, Vidhi; Grinstein, Yaniv

doi:10.2139/ssrn.901642

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CEO Compensation and Board Structure

51 Pages Posted: 17 May 2006 Last revised: 21 Dec 2010

See all articles by Vidhi Chhaochharia

Vidhi Chhaochharia

University of Miami - Department of Finance

Yaniv Grinstein

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Reichman University - Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 10, 2008

Abstract

In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blockholder on the board and in affected firms with low concentration of institutional investors. Our results suggest that the new board requirements affected CEO compensation decisions.

Keywords: CEO compensation, Board of Directors

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J33, J38

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Chhaochharia, Vidhi and Grinstein, Yaniv and Grinstein, Yaniv, CEO Compensation and Board Structure (September 10, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=901642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.901642