The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations

24 Pages Posted: 11 May 2006

See all articles by Mika Widgren

Mika Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than the Council. A data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002 is investigated to test this. In fact, the Council is significantly more conservative than Parliament and Commission; the latter two are significantly closer to each other than Council and Commission.

Keywords: European Commission, European integration, power, collective choice

JEL Classification: C70, D71, H77

Suggested Citation

Widgren, Mika T. and Napel, Stefan, The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (January 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5478. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=901751

Mika T. Widgren (Contact Author)

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

FIN-20500 Turku
Finland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

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