Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure

Business and Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002

19 Pages Posted: 17 May 2006

See all articles by Morten Bennedsen

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems - the vote of confidence procedure - reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying.

Keywords: information and lobbying, party coherence, coalition formation

Suggested Citation

Bennedsen, Morten and Feldmann, Sven E., Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure. Business and Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=901762

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8171 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8144 (Fax)

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