Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions

Posted: 17 May 2006

See all articles by Andrea Attar

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Roma Tor Vergata

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg

Nicolas Porteiro

University Pablo de Olavide

Abstract

This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters (2003, J. Eco. Theory) and suggests that indifference of the single agent with respect to principals' offers plays an important role in the failure of the Revelation Principle in Common Agency games. In addition we provide a new proof of Peters' theorems.

Keywords: Genericity, Direct Mechanisms, Revelation Principle, Common Agency

JEL Classification: D82

Suggested Citation

Attar, Andrea and Piaser, Gwenael and Porteiro, Nicolas, Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions. Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=902402

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics

21, allée de Brienne
Toulouse, F 31000
France
+33 5 61128578 (Phone)

University of Roma Tor Vergata ( email )

2 Via Columbia
00100 Rome
Italy

Gwenael Piaser (Contact Author)

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

148, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg, L-1511
Luxembourg
+ 352 46 66 44 6811 (Fax)

Nicolas Porteiro

University Pablo de Olavide ( email )

Ctra. Utrera, Km.1
Sevilla, Seville 41010
Spain

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