The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors

AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper

FMA Online, Vol. #, No. #, Year

The Review of Financial Studies, v22n8

54 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2005 Last revised: 4 Mar 2018

See all articles by James S. Linck

James S. Linck

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department

Jeffry M. Netter

Department of Finance; University of Georgia Law School

Tina Yang

University of South Florida - Muma College of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 4, 2008

Abstract

Using 8,000 public companies we study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and other contemporary reforms on directors and boards, guided by their impact on the supply and demand for directors. SOX increased director workload and risk (reducing the supply), and increased demand by mandating that firms have more outside directors. We find both broad-based changes and cross-sectional changes (by firm size). Board committees meet more often post SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums doubled. Directors post SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX boards are larger and more independent. Finally, we find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among smaller firms.

Keywords: Board, board discretion, board function, board reform, corporate governance, director liability, independent director, regulation

JEL Classification: D23, G32, G34, G38, K22, M14

Suggested Citation

Linck, James S. and Netter, Jeffry M. and Yang, Tina, The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors (February 4, 2008). AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, FMA Online, Vol. #, No. #, Year, The Review of Financial Studies, v22n8, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=902665 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.687496

James S. Linck (Contact Author)

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department ( email )

United States

Jeffry M. Netter

Department of Finance ( email )

Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States
706-542-4450 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.terry.uga.edu/directory/profile/jnetter/

University of Georgia Law School

225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States

Tina Yang

University of South Florida - Muma College of Business ( email )

140 7th Ave S
St. Petersburg, FL 33701
United States
7278734568 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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