Do Cross-Listings Drive Regulatory Convergence? Evidence from Germany

15 Pages Posted: 18 May 2006

See all articles by Jochen Zimmermann

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics; University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control

Stephan Abee

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics

Date Written: March 10, 2006

Abstract

We analyse the cross listing behavior of German firms on the world's major stock exchanges. We find that only a very small minority of firms with capital market orientation cross list. The U.S. and Switzerland are the most popular locations. Taking into account the type of listing in the U.S., we find no evidence for traditional economic motives of cross listings: Firms do not position themselves to raise funds, to lower their cost of capital by shareholder diversification or to reduce agency costs by opting into a more stringent regulation. The economic motives for convergence of stock market regulation seem thin. Cross listing behavior is therefore unlikely to have an impact on the future shape of the stock exchanges.

Keywords: cross listing, stock exchange regulation, bonding hypothesis

JEL Classification: F36, G15

Suggested Citation

Zimmermann, Jochen and Abée, Stephan, Do Cross-Listings Drive Regulatory Convergence? Evidence from Germany (March 10, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=902827 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.902827

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Hochschulring 4
Germany
+49 421 218 9121 (Phone)

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control ( email )

Universitaetsallee GW I
Bremen, D-28334
Germany
+49 421 218-9119 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.controlling.uni-bremen.de

Stephan Abée (Contact Author)

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Bremen, D-28359
Germany
+49 421 218 9122 (Phone)
+49 421 218 2869 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
269
Abstract Views
1,917
rank
119,051
PlumX Metrics