The Role of Outside Shareholders, Outside Boards, and Management Entrenchment in CEO Selection

38 Pages Posted: 19 May 2006

See all articles by Sangsoo Park

Sangsoo Park

Kyunghee University

Michael S. Rozeff

SUNY at Buffalo - Department of Financial & Managerial Economics

Date Written: June 1986

Abstract

Large outside shareholders, outside boards, and management entrenchment influence the choice of inside or outside CEOs. In a sample of 385 CEO changes from 1979 to 1986, the probability of selecting an outside CEO rises with the level of stock ownership of large outside shareholders and the fraction of the board seats held by outsiders. It falls as management entrenchment increases, as firm size increases, and as firm performance improves. Shareholder value increases more with outside than inside CEO selection. Also, more shareholder value is lost the higher the level of ownership by the new CEO relative to the level of ownership by the outgoing CEO, unless the firm has a large outside shareholder. The results are consistent with the view that large outside shareholders play an active role in controlling manager-shareholder conflicts.

Keywords: Outside shareholders, management entrenchment, CEO selection

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Park, Sangsoo and Rozeff, Michael S., The Role of Outside Shareholders, Outside Boards, and Management Entrenchment in CEO Selection (June 1986). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=903219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.903219

Sangsoo Park

Kyunghee University

Dongdaemun-ku
Seoul, Gyeonggi-Do 446-701
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Michael S. Rozeff (Contact Author)

SUNY at Buffalo - Department of Financial & Managerial Economics ( email )

Buffalo, NY 14260
United States

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