Civic Attitudes and the Design of Labour Market Institutions: Which Countries can Implement the Danish Flexicurity Model?

46 Pages Posted: 19 May 2006  

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yann Algan

Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: February 2006

Abstract

We argue that the efficiency of the Danish flexicurity Model, which combines high unemployment benefits with low job protection and high participation rate, relies on strong public-spiritedness. We also argue that Continental and Mediterranean European countries are unlikely to be able to implement the Danish Model because the lack of public-spiritedness of their citizens raises moral hazard issues which hinder the implementation of efficient public unemployment insurance.

Keywords: Job protection, unemployment benefits, civic attitudes

JEL Classification: J23, J65, J68

Suggested Citation

Cahuc, Pierre and Algan, Yann, Civic Attitudes and the Design of Labour Market Institutions: Which Countries can Implement the Danish Flexicurity Model? (February 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5489. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=903307

Pierre Cahuc (Contact Author)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/

French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yann Algan

Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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