Information in Mechanism Design

44 Pages Posted: 19 May 2006

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics; University of Southampton - Division of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2006

Abstract

We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We specifically consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information. Second, we argue that in the presence of endogenous information, the robustness of the mechanism to the type space and higher order beliefs becomes a natural desideratum. We discuss recent approaches to robust mechanism design and robust implementation.

Keywords: Information, acquisition, mechanism, design, robust

JEL Classification: D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Valimaki, Juuso, Information in Mechanism Design (February 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5494. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=903409

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 21210
Helsinki 00100, 00101
Finland

University of Southampton - Division of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
+44 23 8059 3263 (Phone)

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