Mexican Constitutionalism after Presidencialismo

Abstract

The election of Vicente Fox to the presidency of Mexico signified not only the end of single-party rule in Mexico, but also generated changes in Mexico's constitutional order. Heretofore, a top-down system of presidencialismo had dominated Mexico's political order. With the demise of one-party rule, Mexico began to experience changes in its key constitutional institutions. These changes include an unprecedentedly disempowered presidency, a newly divided Congress, and a freshly empowered Supreme Court (which had long been a minor factor in Mexican constitutional activities) taking a new, key role.

This article discusses the nature of these changes, focusing particularly on issues such as separation of powers, the new roles of the Congress and Supreme Court, and changes to Mexican federalism. The article asserts that the stresses of multiparty politics will continue to place strains on key institutions of Mexican constitutionalism, which will require careful and deliberate responses from those institutions.

Keywords: Mexico, federalism, Supreme Court, congress, presidency, Vicente Fox, PAN, PRI, Presidencialismo, separation of powers, amparo, balance of power, controversia constitucional, judicialization of politics, revenue sharing

JEL Classification: K00, K19, K23, K49, Z00