Democracy and Protectionism

33 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006  

Kevin H. O'Rourke

University of Dublin, Trinity College; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alan M. Taylor

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics; University of Virginia - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

Does democracy encourage free trade? It depends. Broadening the franchise involves transferring power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will be workers. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson logic says that democratization should lead to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies in countries where workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. We test and confirm these political economy implications of trade theory hypothesis using data on democracy, factor endowments, and protection in the late nineteenth century.

Suggested Citation

O'Rourke, Kevin H. and Taylor, Alan M., Democracy and Protectionism (May 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12250. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=903888

Kevin H. O'Rourke (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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University of Dublin, Trinity College ( email )

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Alan M. Taylor

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/amtaylor/

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://people.virginia.edu/~amt7u

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://nber.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://cepr.org

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