Breaking Down the Residual Category: Policy Stability Among Dictatorships from a Veto Players Perspective

39 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006

See all articles by Erica Frantz

Erica Frantz

Bridgewater State University

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that policies in dictatorships require the tacit support of two actors: the leader of the regime (an individual veto player) and the individuals the leader relies on for support (a collective veto player). I show that the collective veto player differs across personalist, military, and single party dictatorships in important ways. Due to such differences, it should be easiest to change policy in personalist regimes and most difficult in single party regimes. I test this statistically by comparing responses to exogenous economic shocks and fluctuations in inflation rates across dictatorships. I find substantial support for my argument.

Keywords: dictatorships, veto players, policy stability, authoritarian regimes, authoritarian institutions

Suggested Citation

Frantz, Erica, Breaking Down the Residual Category: Policy Stability Among Dictatorships from a Veto Players Perspective (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=904263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.904263

Erica Frantz (Contact Author)

Bridgewater State University ( email )

Bridgewater, MA 02325
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
130
Abstract Views
948
rank
255,147
PlumX Metrics