Inequality and Outside Options in Common-Property Resource Use

43 Pages Posted: 26 May 2006

See all articles by Nori Tarui

Nori Tarui

University of Hawaii - Department of Economics

Abstract

Using a dynamic intergenerational game, this paper analyzes the effects of inequality among resource users and their access to outside markets and credit on cooperative use of a local commons. The study finds that, depending on the agents' harvest sharing rule, the conditions under which homogeneous agents can cooperate in equilibrium may not be sufficient for cooperation when agents differ in harvesting productivity. The resource users' access to outside markets or credit may have a negative effect on efficient local resource management.

Keywords: Common property resource, Cooperation, Dynamic game, Inequality, Credit

JEL Classification: C7, D62, O1, Q20

Suggested Citation

Tarui, Nori, Inequality and Outside Options in Common-Property Resource Use. Journal of Development Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=904521

Nori Tarui (Contact Author)

University of Hawaii - Department of Economics ( email )

Honolulu, HI 96822
United States

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