Education and Labor-Market Discrimination

32 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2006 Last revised: 30 Jun 2010

See all articles by Kevin Lang

Kevin Lang

Boston University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Manove

Boston University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

We propose a model that combines statistical discrimination and educational sorting that explains why blacks get more education than do whites of similar cognitive ability. Our model explains the difference between blacks and whites in the relations between education and AFQT and between wages and education. It cannot easily explain why, conditional only on AFQT, blacks earn no more than do whites. It does, however, suggest, that when comparing the earnings of blacks and whites, one should control for both AFQT and education in which case a substantial black-white wage differential reemerges. We explore and reject the hypothesis that differences in school quality between blacks and whites explain the wage and education di%uFB00erentials. Our findings support the view that some of the black-white wage di%uFB00erential reflects the operation of the labor market.

Suggested Citation

Lang, Kevin and Manove, Michael, Education and Labor-Market Discrimination (May 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12257. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=905514

Kevin Lang (Contact Author)

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Michael Manove

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-3299 (Phone)
617-353-4449 (Fax)

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