Communication Dilemma in Speculative Markets
39 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2006
Date Written: March 2006
Abstract
We study voluntary information exchange widely observed among traders in financial markets. In the context of a standard market microstructure model, based on Kyle (1984, 1985), we show that disparately informed traders are better off by exchanging information provided that they are risk averse and the market is opaque. For some parameter values, the equilibrium yields a prisoners' dilemma result in which traders hoard information even though it is beneficial for them to exchange. In the presence of interpersonal costs, which penalize those who hoard information when others disclose, information exchange can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Repeated interactions can also sustain, in equilibrium, information exchange.
Keywords: voluntary information exchange, prisoners' dilemma, communication dilemma, interpersonal costs
JEL Classification: D82, D84, G10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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