Electoral Endorsements and Campaign Contributions

30 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2006 Last revised: 23 Nov 2010

See all articles by Elena Panova

Elena Panova

Toulouse School of Economics

Date Written: April 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper models information transmission in an electoral campaign. The voters have conflicting policy interests, but they are congruent in their desire to elect a competent politician. They hold private information about the candidates for office, and they use endorsements and campaign contributions to signal their information, so as to advertise their most preferred candidates. Endorsements are cheap talk, but campaign contributions are costly, hence, contributions are stronger signals than endorsements. Therefore, contributions help to transmit information when voter interests are relatively divergent (however, not so much that campaigning is useless).

Keywords: campaign contributions, cheap talk, burned money, incumbency advantage

JEL Classification: D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Panova, Elena, Electoral Endorsements and Campaign Contributions (April 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=905924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.905924

Elena Panova (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

21 Allée de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France

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