Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation

12 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2006

See all articles by Dakshina G. De Silva

Dakshina G. De Silva

Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School

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Abstract

This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained. (JEL D44)

Suggested Citation

De Silva, Dakshina G., Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 43, Issue 1, pp. 55-66, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=906219

Dakshina G. De Silva (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

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